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NOTE
TEXT “YES” TO GIVE: AN ANALYSIS OF FEC-
PERMITTED ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA IN
TEXT-MESSAGE-BASED POLITICAL
DONATION SYSTEMS
Michael A. Magdelinskas*
This Note reviews the permissibility of “eligibility criteria” for text-
message-based political donation systems.  In 2012, the Federal Election
Commission released a series of advisory opinions to clarify the rules
governing these new donation platforms, bringing campaign finance reg-
ulations further into the digital era.  The most onerous component of
these systems involve the use of “eligibility criteria” or thresholds,
which are set by the wireless carrier, to determine which candidates
qualify for participation in the carrier’s donation mechanisms.
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Part II analyses the eligibility criteria, including discussing their
parameters, and addresses the arguments made for and against their
permissibility.  In arguing for the permissibility of eligibility criteria, this
Note draws from relevant analogues where courts have upheld eligibility
criteria and systematically addresses the deficiencies in the arguments
challenging such criteria.  Yet the text message donation systems are
critically distinct from these analogues. As these systems utilize wireless
spectrum, a regulated commodity, a new challenge could emerge from
relevant telecommunications law. Part III argues that such a challenge
would fail, by addressing the Federal Communication Commission’s
common carrier restrictions and delving into an analysis of their
applicability to text messages. Finally Part IV concludes with an analysis
of the three distinct impacts these donations systems will have on the
election landscape.
INTRODUCTION
Since the controversial decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elec-
tions Commission,1 the role of money in our political system has come
under greater scrutiny.2  Despite this intensified attention, a record six
billion dollars in election expenses were reported to the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) in 2012, making it the most expensive election cycle
in U.S. history.3  While the focus, with good reason, has been on high-
spending Political Action Committees (PACs), these organizations are
not the only innovative funding mechanisms available to campaigns.  Re-
cently, text-message-based donations have become a popular new tool
for fundraising and, more importantly, campaign development.
As the significance of money has been amplified, increasingly so-
phisticated campaigns have sought more nuanced ways to reach out to
their constituents and into their pockets.  Instead of the traditional model
of reliance on a core base of wealthy donors, new efforts focus on in-
creasing the number of small donations from a wider base.  President
Obama’s presidential campaigns, for example, were innovative due to
their applied use of behavioral economics and social science, and conse-
quently were highly effective at collecting smaller donations.4  It is no
wonder that President Obama, as well as Republican Party presidential
1 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2 See, e.g., King & Spalding Client Alert, Greater Scrutiny of Corporate Lobbying and
Political Activity Underway (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/
library/publication/ca091912b.pdf.
3 2012 Election Spending Will Reach $6 Billion, Center for Responsive Politics
Predicts, OPENSECRETSBLOG (Oct. 31, 2012, 2:33 PM), http://opensecrets.org.
4 See Benedict Carey, Academic ‘Dream Team’ Helped Obama’s Effort, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2012, at D1, available at www.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/health/dream-team-of-beha
vioral-scientists-advised-obama-campaign.html. See also Dan Morain, Small Donors’ Dollars
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nominee Mitt Romney, were avid proponents of the FEC approval of a
text-messaging-based donation system, as requested by Representative
Jim Cooper.5
Largely unnoticed by the FEC was that someone donating by these
systems was automatically “opted in” to a campaign’s contact list, al-
lowing campaigns to call and text the donor’s mobile number for further
donations, or to send information about campaign events and updates.6
“The real impact is through increasing engagement with the campaign,”
said Aaron Scherb, a Congressional liaison for campaign finance reform
group Public Campaign.7  “Campaigns can increase the percent of small
donors that they have in the short term and build lists for this and future
campaigns.”8
The rationale behind the adoption of this donation system could eas-
ily be attributed to overtures of increased political participation for a
wider swath of Americans.  Research shows that young adults and mi-
norities are more likely to text contributions than donate via the internet
or via traditional fundraisers.9  These systems also appeal to a technolog-
ically savvy younger generation and aim to initiate a culture of giving
that is maintained through adulthood.10  By tapping into the highly im-
pulsive nature of text-message-based contributions, political campaigns
have found a lucrative way to engage young Americans.11
Add Up for Obama, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 30, 2012, at 1E, available at http://www.sacbee
.com/2012/09/30/4864698/small-donors-dollars-add-up-for.html.
5 Both the Obama for America and Romney for President campaigns submitted com-
ments under FEC Advisory Opinion No. 2012–17 (June 11, 2012), available at http://saos.nict
usa.com/aodocs/AO%202012-17%20Red%20Blue%20T,%20LLC,%20ArmourMedia,%20
Inc.,%20and%20m-Qube,%20Inc.)%20Final%20(Signed)%20(6.11.12).pdf.  Obama for
America comment available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1209994.pdf.  Romney for Pres-
ident comment available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1209992.pdf.
6 FEC Will Allow Campaign Donations by Text, MARKETPLACE (June 19, 2009), http://
www.marketplace.org/topics/elections/campaign-trail/fec-will-allow-campaign-donations-text.
7 Janie Lorber, Obama’s Campaign Quick to Capitalize on Text-to-Donate Option,
ROLL CALL (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.rollcall.com/news/Obama-Campaign-Quick-to-Capi
talize-on-Text-to-Donate-Option-218432-1.html.
8 Id.
9 Campaign Donations by Text Coming, But When?, WIN BY CELL (2012), http://winby
cell.com/?p=192.
10 Nicole Wallace, The Demographics of Text-Message Giving, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY
(Mar. 4, 2010), http://philanthropy.com/blogs/prospecting/the-demographics-of-text-message-
giving/21628.
11 A Pew Internet and American Life Project study found that donations can be highly
impulsive.  Half of the donors who supported disaster relief after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti
donated immediately upon hearing about the campaign via text.  Overall, nine percent of
Americans have made charitable donations with their cellphones, contributing an estimated
$43 million to disaster relief in Haiti alone. See T.W. Farnam, Dial a donation, WASH. POST
(Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-influence-industry-fec-offers-
guidance-for-cellphone-text-message-donations/2012/08/15/bca02562-e6ec-11e1-8f62-58260e
3940a0_story.html.
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A highly controversial component to these newly approved pro-
grams centers on the ability of wireless carriers to establish “eligibility
criteria,” through which carriers can subsequently exclude certain candi-
dates from utilizing their systems.  The eligibility criteria are indepen-
dently selected requirements a candidate must meet in order to qualify
for a carrier’s text-message-based donation program.  While the FEC has
afforded each carrier the liberty to establish their own criteria, CTIA, the
Wireless Association trade group representing all of the major carriers in
the United States (AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile), provides gui-
dance on the selection of these criteria to all of its members.  Despite this
guidance, carriers still possess complete freedom to determine their own
requirements so long as the criteria relates to “commercial viability.”  As
will be discussed at length later, this vague term has been interpreted
broadly and thus has been ineffective in inhibiting abuse in analogous
contexts.12
Despite the potential for the use of these criteria to arbitrarily ex-
clude candidates, I argue that the criteria are legally permissible and fully
consistent with the Federal Election Campaign Act.13  Traditionally,
challenges to these criteria have been based on free speech, equal protec-
tion, or delegation of powers arguments; however, such arguments have
proven ineffective because the FEC has passed responsibility for the cre-
ation of the criteria on the wireless carriers, thus removing the state ac-
tion requirement.14  To circumvent the courts’ predisposition to afford
deference to FEC decisions, modern challenges have tried more creative
legal arguments, such as bringing a restraint of trade argument under the
Sherman Act.15  Given the prior FEC determinations, one should deduce
that these eligibility criteria are legally permissible, despite a number of
plausible arguments to the contrary.
First, Part I of this Note provides a historical context for how these
donation schemes came into existence and the technical mechanics by
which they function.  The Note then analyses of the eligibility criteria in
Part II, including discussing their parameters, and also addressing the
arguments made for and against their permissibility.  In arguing for the
permissibility of eligibility criteria, I draw from relevant analogues
where courts have upheld eligibility criteria and systematically address
the deficiencies in the arguments challenging such criteria.  Yet the text
message donation systems are critically distinct from these analogues.
12 See infra Part II.A.
13 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (Feb.
7, 1972), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq.
14 The FEC’s retained authority to review the criteria has not been held to constitute state
action. See e.g., Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381 (1st Cir. 2000).
15 See, e.g., Johnson v. Comm’n Presidential Debs., No. SACV12-01600 PSG (D. Cal.
filed Sept. 21, 2012).
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As these systems utilize wireless spectrum, a regulated commodity, a
challenge could emerge from relevant telecommunications law.  Part III
argues that such a challenge would fail, by addressing the Federal Com-
munication Commission’s common carrier restrictions and delving into
an analysis of their applicability to text messages.  Here too, the relevant
laws support the permissibility of independently-created eligibility crite-
ria.  Finally, in Part IV, I conclude my analysis with insights on the three
distinct impacts I believe these donations systems will have on the cur-
rent election landscape.
I. MECHANICS OF TEXT-BASED DONATION SYSTEMS
While text-message-based donations would seem a natural exten-
sion of modern fundraising techniques, the Federal Election Commission
had not been asked to comment on such donations until the summer of
2012.16  The Commission was spurred to action by a request from Red
Blue T and ArmourMedia, Inc., media and political consulting firms ad-
vising political action committees interested in receiving individual con-
tributions through a text-message-based system.17  The Commission was
asked to consider whether such systems could be implemented in accor-
dance with the Federal Election Campaign Act (the Act), specifically
with regard to record keeping, recording, and proper segregation of cor-
porate and political funds.18  The requesting parties proposed working
with m-Qube, a “corporate aggregator of business-to-consumer messag-
ing and merchant billing for public wireless service providers,” that
joined the firms on their request for FEC comment.19  M-Qube would
enter into agreements with the political action committees, process the
contributions, and provide the committees with the ten-digit phone num-
ber from which the donation was received.  However, m-Qube would not
disclose contributor names or addresses.20
M-Qube identified two potential methods for donating through text
message.21  The first involved an individual texting a word or phrase to a
specific “short code,” a four or five digit code that is akin to a telephone
number.22  M-Qube would then respond via text, asking the individual to
16 See FEC Advisory Opinion No. 2012–17 (June 11, 2012), available at http://saos.nict
usa.com/aodocs/AO%202012-17%20Red%20Blue%20T,%20LLC,%20ArmourMedia,%20
Inc.,%20and%20m-Qube,%20Inc.)%20Final%20(Signed)%20(6.11.12).pdf.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.  The issues concerning disclosure eventually lead to FEC Advisory Opinion No.
2012-26 (Aug. 14, 2012), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/AO%202012-26.pdf,
which addressed each party’s disclosure requirements and liabilities.
21 See FEC Advisory Opinion No. 2012–17.
22 Short codes are country specific, thus only those which are serviced by US-based
wireless providers could opt-in.
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confirm their intent to donate and their eligibility to do so under the Act.
The second method involved an individual going to a political action
committee website and using their mobile number instead of a credit
card.  M-Qube would process the request and send a personal identifica-
tion number (PIN) to the specified mobile number, which the individual
would need to enter online to complete the transaction.  Once completed,
the individual’s wireless account would be charged.23  To better comply
with the Act, m-Qube would require any political action committee using
the service to be registered and in “good-standing” with the Commission,
and capped donations at $50 a month for any one political action com-
mittee.24  As any individual who donates over $200 to one candidate,
committee, or party is subject to additional FEC disclosure requirements,
the aggregator, m-Qube in this scenario, is responsible for keeping a real-
time tally of the $50 donations.25
After analyzing this proposal, the FEC determined in advisory opin-
ion 2012–17 that m-Qube’s system adhered to all existing restrictions,
and that thus such text-message-based donations to political committees
were permissible.26  This opinion was limited in its purview and only
approved of donations to political action committees.
Inspired by the initial foray into the political realm permitted by the
Commission, it was only a matter of time before m-Qube attempted to
expand its services into campaign contributions.  Representative Jim
Cooper’s campaign was the first to test the waters, working in tandem
with m-Qube.27  His campaign requested an advisory opinion from the
Commission on whether their proposed system, modeled after the one
previously approved of in AO 2012–17, was permissible.28  In Represen-
tative Cooper’s proposal, disclosure requirements fell to the campaign,
and any discounts secured by m-Qube with the wireless carriers did not
constitute an in-kind contribution to the campaign.29  The Commission
responded in AO 2012–26 confirming the permissibility of Rep.
Cooper’s proposal.30  Then, in response to concerns from the CTIA,31 the
FEC released AO 2012–28, which further clarified that wireless carriers
were not liable for confirming whether donors were American citizens or
that they were within the annual political contribution limits as set forth
23 See FEC Advisory Opinion No. 2012–17.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See FEC Advisory Opinion No. 2012–26.
28 Id.
29 Id. The issue of in-kind contributions will not be addressed in this Note.
30 See generally FEC Advisory Opinion 2012–26.
31 Juliana Gruenwald, FEC Addresses Industry Concerns Over Text Campaign Dona-
tions, NAT’L JOURNAL (Aug. 15, 2012, 6:08 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/blogs/
techdailydose/2012/08/fec-addresses-industry-concerns-over-text-campaign-donations-15.
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by the FEC.  Effectively, all disclosure and reporting requirements are
the responsibility of the campaign accepting the funds.32
One may wonder what constitutes “objective business criteria,” and
at what point a decision crosses the line from a business decision to a
political decision.  Although CTIA tasked itself with drafting guidance
documents, the organization’s current effort provides essentially no clari-
fication on how to adhere to the FEC guidelines.  CTIA’s Guidelines for
Federal Political Campaign Contributions via Wireless Carrier’s Bill,
Version 1.0 (Carrier Guidelines) is nothing more than a restatement of
FEC opinions on text message campaigns.33  The Carrier Guidelines ex-
pand the discretionary powers of individual wireless companies by pro-
viding that
CTIA and its carrier member companies reserve the right
to amend these recommendations at any time and may at
their discretion waive any stated recommendation.  Indi-
vidual carriers also reserve the right to establish addi-
tional requirements of their own, including contribution
thresholds lower than the maximums permitted by the
Federal Election Commission.34
Yet with a nominal limit of $200 as the cap for text message dona-
tions, such exclusionary practices could be seen as an inconvenience,
likely inconsequential in the larger scheme of financing political cam-
paigns.  However, FEC AO 2012–30 complicated this issue in two sig-
nificant ways.  First, the Commission approved a process for accepting
donations in excess of the $50 and $200 limits requiring donors to pro-
vide additional information and verification.35  Second, the Commission
validated the sharing of short codes between different political commit-
tees,36 simply requiring that each committee be tied to a specific texted
key word.37  The latter is significant, as short codes can be cost prohibi-
tive to many smaller campaigns, thus opening text-message-based dona-
tions as a viable option for smaller operations.38
With individual donors able to donate up to the federal cap via text
message and the desire of smaller campaigns to tap into text message
donations, the prospect of wireless carriers being able to preclude spe-
32 See FEC Advisory Opinion No. 2012–28 (Aug. 14, 2012), available at http://
saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/AO%202012-28.pdf.
33 See Guidelines for Federal Political Campaign Contributions via Wireless Carrier’s
Bill, Version 1.0, CTIA—THE WIRELESS ASS’N (Aug. 23, 2012), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Politi
cal_Contribution_Recommendations_FINAL_v_1_0.pdf.
34 Id. at 3.
35 See FEC Advisory Opinion 2012–30 (Sept. 4, 2012), at 6.
36 Id.
37 See id., at 8.
38 See id. at 4.
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cific campaigns raises concern.  As discussed below, the potential impact
is more complicated than injury to a third-party candidate.  There is am-
ple opportunity for a carrier to utilize its selectivity to the advantage of
third-party candidates who demonstrate a likelihood of siphoning votes
from the carrier’s non-preferred candidate.  This is currently permissible
under the existing FEC guidelines.
This Part has presented an overview of the technical mechanics by
which text-message-based campaign contributions occur.  Part II delves
into the “eligibility criteria” and the plethora of issues that emerge from
their construction by entities outside the FEC.  This Part will also address
analogous cases where eligibility criteria have been deemed permissible
in other FEC-regulated areas.
II. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
A. A Problem in Construction
As noted above, the FEC afforded the wireless industry broad dis-
cretion to determine who can utilize this new method of political dona-
tions by allowing wireless carriers to establish their own eligibility
criteria.  In doing so, the FEC recalled an advisory opinion from 2006,
AO 2006–34, in which the FEC approved an affinity program that a cor-
porate vender (Working Assets, Inc.) proposed to make available “sub-
ject to each particular program’s commercial viability determined by
common commercial principles.”39  Although neither the FEC nor Work-
ing Assets defined the scope of “common commercial principles,” Work-
ing Assets provided a non-exhaustive list of potential factors that
included: the “number of potential customers, potential for long-term
customer commitment, strength of trademark, and credit rating of mem-
bership.”40  Importantly, the Working Assets proposal stated the program
“would be made available to any political party committee, non-con-
nected political committee, or QNC (qualified non-profit corporation)
that asks to participate, without regard to party affiliation or ideological
orientation.”41
Yet this non-partisan language is notably absent from the advisory
request and supplemental comments for AO 2012–28.42  In the initial
July 3, 2012, request for an advisory opinion, CTIA sought the FEC’s
approval of a program in which the wireless carriers could “exclude can-
didates for certain offices, exclude so-called fringe candidates, or poten-
39 FEC Advisory Opinion 2006–34 (Feb. 9, 2007), at 2.
40 Id. at 2.
41 Id. (emphasis added).
42 See Request for Advisory Opinion from Jan W. Baran & Caleb P. Burns, on behalf of
CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n, to FEC (July 3, 2012), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/
aodocs/1214939.pdf.  This request would lead to the issuance of FEC Advisory Op. 2012–28.
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tially refuse to provide service to all political committees,” in addition to
the commercial viability constraints.43  The document was subsequently
amended on July 26, 2012, to clarify their initial request by framing the
proposed eligibility criteria as comparable to non-political text donation
programs.44  CTIA wanted to place the focus on quantitative criteria,
specifically stating that objective business criteria would result in ac-
cepting only those campaigns that can demonstrate “significant fundrais-
ing ability (e.g., candidates with approval ratings over a certain threshold
or with a strong record of past fundraising).”45  Despite the amendment,
the criteria remained intentionally vague, opening the door to
questioning.
To pose the obvious question—is it not difficult, without appropri-
ate guidance, to determine when certain decisions are made for political
rather than commercial reasons?  A simple hypothetical illustrates this
point: consider a presidential candidate stating that wireless companies
are under-regulated and should be subject to greater restrictions from the
FCC.  This would increase wireless companies’ operating costs in addi-
tion to prospective costs for litigation.  On these grounds, the wireless
carriers exclude the candidate from their donation programs on the
grounds that it affects the carriers’ profit margins.  Was that a decision
made on “ideological orientation” or rather a stated potential policy that
will affect the “commercial viability” of the wireless carrier?  When do
ideas shift from political theory to policy with quantifiable impact?
While such a scenario closely skirts the line between these two poles, it
demonstrates that the basis for some decisions is not obvious, and the
FEC’s omission of defined standards could leave candidates straining to
interpret whether their rejection from a carrier program was valid.
B. The Counterpoint
The potential for abuse of discretion did not go unnoticed.  During
the FEC’s notice and comment process, prominent political lawyer Neil
Reiff submitted a comment on behalf of his client, Revolution Messag-
ing, noting CTIA’s exclusionary processes and their exaggeration of the
potential negative effect of allowing access to all candidates.46  In a
pointed criticism, Reiff stated, “[t]ext messaging fundraising is not a new
phenomenon.  The CTIA and carriers have already provided short codes
and premium messaging to very controversial groups such as gangster
43 Id.
44 Request for Advisory Opinion Supplemental Submission from Jan W. Baran & Caleb
P. Burns, on behalf of CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n, to FEC 1 (Jul. 26, 2012), available at http:/
/saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1214939.pdf.
45 Id. at 6.
46 Memorandum from Neil P. Reiff, on behalf of Revolution Messaging, to FEC 1 (Aug.
13, 2012), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1223426.pdf.
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rap ringtones, sex tip messaging, pornography, and horoscopes without
hurting their brand images.”47  In referring to these various services,
Reiff sought to dispel the argument that certain candidates and their posi-
tions could be negatively associated with the wireless company.  Reiff
continued,
[c]learly the Commission should not completely abro-
gate its future responsibilities to determine whether arbi-
trary denial of access by CTIA or carrier[ ]s may not
somehow violate the Act in some future context.  There
may be circumstances in which such arbitrary actions,
such as the complete denial of services of one party or
candidate, in preference of another, could implicate the
Act.48
Despite these comments, the FEC did not impose any additional restric-
tions on the carriers and approved their proposed programs.49
C. Analogues
Although Reiff’s comments commendably raise the prospect of ar-
bitrary exclusions, they fail to discuss the FEC’s determination that the
Act allows for some level of exclusion based on pre-established criteria.
Specifically, the Code of Federal Regulations states that “participation in
candidate debates can be based on ‘pre-established objective criteria.’”50
The lawyers for CTIA knew this fact and relied on this language in the
amended request for AO 2012–28.51  In grounding its request in a long-
standing, though oft-challenged section of the code CTIA sought to legit-
imize its proposed practice.  While the FEC has successfully resisted
every challenge to the debate participation criteria, the challenges have
increased in both frequency and scope in recent years.
Although evident, it should be noted that presidential debates, com-
pared to the current issue of campaign contribution systems, are entirely
different in their function.  However, both are highly regulated aspects of
the political system that fall under the purview of the FEC; more specifi-
cally, they are both governed by the FEC’s interpretations on the Federal
Election Campaign Act.  The coequal reliance on the broad interpretation
of “pre-established objective criteria” is what binds these disparate prac-
tices and makes them analogous.
47 Id. at 1.
48 Id. at 2.
49 See FEC Advisory Opinion No. 2012–28 (Aug. 14, 2012), available at http://
saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/AO%202012-28.pdf
50 11 C.F.R § 110.13(c) (2013).
51 See Request for Advisory Opinion Supplemental Submission from Jan W. Baran &
Caleb P. Burns, on behalf of CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n, to FEC, supra note 42, at 6.
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The U.S. presidential debates are moderated by the Commission on
Presidential Debates (CPD), a 501(c)(3) organization that is sponsored
through private contributions.52  Although CDP sounds like a department
of the federal government, it is actually a private entity created in 1987
by the Democratic and Republican parties to establish the protocols for
conducting debates.53  The organization is responsible for devising and
publishing the criteria required for participation in the televised de-
bates.54  Both its history and financial status have garnered intense scru-
tiny from pro-democracy groups that believe the CPD is an inherently
biased organization.55  Although some claims are inevitably baseless, the
perception of bias is not ill-founded.
Having secured 19% of the popular vote in the 1992 election and
having been permitted to appear at the presidential debates that year,
Ross Perot assumed the CPD would allow him to appear in the 1996
presidential debates.56  However, the CPD, after reviewing its factors,
informed the candidate that he had not met the criteria for that year’s
debates.57  In September, Perot brought an administrative complaint
against the CPD to the FEC, alleging “the CPD had used subjective crite-
ria to select debate participants, contrary to the Commission’s regulations
that state that objective criteria must be used in the selection process.”58
Perot supported this claim by noting the subjectivity of some of the fac-
tors, such as polling results and opinions of journalists.59  Of particular
relevance, Perot alleged that the pre-selected eligibility criteria were for-
mulated to prevent any third-party candidate from gaining access to the
debate.60  The circuit court affirmed the district court’s summary judg-
ment against Perot, and remanded to the district court to dismiss without
prejudice one remaining count.  This was, essentially, the death knell for
Perot’s challenge.
Yet it was not without merit, a fact eventually raised within the
FEC.  In 1997, Lawrence Noble, the General Counsel of the FEC, recom-
mended a full inquiry into the CPD, believing it had violated numerous
52 See National Debate Sponsors, COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, http://www
.debates.org/index.php?page=national-debate-sponsors (last visited Dec. 13, 2012).
53 JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE AMERI-
CAN PEOPLE 263, n.4 (2003).
54 See, e.g., 2012 Candidate Selection Criteria, COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES,
http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=candidate-selection-process (last visited Dec. 21,
2012).
55 See Critics of the CPD, Open Debates, http://www.opendebates.org/news/crtics.html
(last visited Dec. 13, 2012).
56 RASKIN, supra note 53, at 126.
57 See id.
58 Court Case Abstracts, Federal Election Commission, http://www.fec.gov/law/litiga
tion_CCA_P.shtml (last visited Dec. 21, 2013).
59 See Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553, 556–57 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
60 See id.
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debate regulations, including the use of impermissible candidate selec-
tion criteria, and that the CPD had made prohibited contributions to the
Clinton and Dole committees.61  Without fanfare, a six-member adjudi-
catory commission unanimously voted to reject the General Counsel’s
recommendation.62  With this vote, the eligibility criteria remained
unaltered.
One of CPD’s most challenged criteria is the “level of support”
component, which requires any candidate who wants to debate to have “a
level of support of at least 15% of the national electorate as determined
by five selected national public opinion polling organizations, using the
average of the organization’s most recent publicly reported results at the
time of determination.”63  Logical flaws in its construction plague these
criteria.  First, the percentage selected is a patently arbitrary distinction
that represents no particular level of awareness of a candidate by the
general public.  Put another way, “[t]he 15-percent figure raises the bar
absurdly high.”64  CDP could have looked to the FEC for guidance, such
as selecting five percent, which is the percentage of the national popular
vote a candidate must receive in order to qualify his party for public
financing in the next election.65  Yet they disregarded adopting relatively
objective standards in favor of their own determinations.
In 2000, presidential candidate Ralph Nader petitioned the Massa-
chusetts District Court to find that the FEC’s regulations on debates, spe-
cifically 11 CFR 110.13 and 114.4(f), were unlawful.66  In focusing on
the fifteen percent level of support as part of the eligibility criteria, Nader
argued the rule was arbitrary and existed solely to exclude third party
candidates.67  The district court held that such regulations were not in
excess of the FEC’s statutory authority under the Act.68  Despite an ap-
peal to the First Circuit69 and a petition for writ of certiorari from the
Supreme Court,70 the district court’s ruling was upheld.
While these cases would appear to settle the validity of the eligibil-
ity criteria, the exclusionary nature of the practice continues to inspire
challenges.  Suspecting the previously challenged grounds to be weak,
recent cases have relied on vastly broader challenges to the selection cri-
61 RASKIN, supra note 53, at 124–25.
62 Id. at 128.
63 Id. at 126.
64 Id.
65 See id.
66 See Becker v. FEC, 112 F. Supp. 2d 172, 173 (D. Mass. 2000).
67 See Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381, 386 (1st Cir. 2000).
68 Id. at 394–97.
69 See generally id.
70 See Nader v. FEC, 532 U.S. 1007 (2001).
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teria.  In particular, the 2012 elections presented a number of unique
arguments.
Gary Johnson, the Libertarian presidential candidate, took the ap-
proach of filing an anti-trust suit against the CPD, Republican National
Committee, and Democratic National Committee, alleging violations of
the Sherman Act.71  Johnson makes a restraint of trade argument, calling
the $400,000 salary of the president “commerce” and the collusion of the
named defendants to restrict his ascension as “restriction of trade.”72
The restrictions he is referencing, in part, are the eligibility criteria.
Johnson’s challenge did not receive significant media coverage, which
led to some parties decrying a continued corporate bias against third-
party candidates.73  As of September 2013, the suit remains active.74  On
September 4, 2013, the parties met with U.S. District Court Judge Fer-
nando Olguin to determine whether the Johnson campaign is entitled to
discovery, as they seek to uncover the ways in which the criteria were set
and whether there were communications between the CPD and the major
national parties.75  Regardless of whether Johnson is entitled to discov-
ery, the suit is likely to fail.  The Supreme Court has explicitly stated the
principle that “the antitrust laws regulate business, not politics.”76
Green Party candidate Jill Stein announced her own lawsuit, not
only against the CPD, RNC, and DNC, but additionally the FEC and
Lynn University, where the debate was to be held.77  Stein attempted the
“kitchen-sink” approach, claiming exclusion from the debates denies her
Due Process under the 14th Amendment, (both substantive and procedu-
ral) denial of Equal Protection under both the Florida and Federal Consti-
tutions, and denial of Freedom of Speech.78  While her panoply of claims
are too extensive to parse here, again the claims focus on the exclusion-
ary criteria.  Stein says the “clearly arbitrary, capricious, vague, and sub-
71 See Chris Sagers, Gary Johnson, Antitrust Plaintiff, Sues Major Parties for Mono-
polizing Politics, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 2012, 2:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
chris-sagers/gary-johnson-antitrust-pl_b_1917570.html.
72 Complaint, Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, No. SACV12-01600 PSG
(D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2012).
73 See Matthew Reece, Lack of Coverage of CPD Lawsuit Reveals Establishment Media
Bias, EXAMINER (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/lack-of-coverage-of-cpd-
lawsuit-reveals-establishment-media-bias.
74 See  Richard Winger, Gary Johnson Campaign Waits a Ruling from U.S. District
Court on Whether Discovery can Proceed in Lawsuit Against Commission on Presidential
Debates, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.ballot-access.org/2013/09/gary-
johnson-campaign-waits-a-ruling-from-u-s-district-court-on-whether-discovery-can-proceed-
in-lawsuit-against-commission-on-presidential-debates.
75 Id.
76 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383 (1991).
77 Jill Stein, Stein Files Lawsuit Against the CPD, JILLSTEIN.ORG, (Oct. 22, 2012), http://
www.jillstein.org/lawsuit_cpd.
78 Stein v.  FEC, (Cir. Ct. Fl. filed Oct. 22, 2012).
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jective participation criteria regarding ‘polling data’ and ‘support’ and
other such unreliable, subjective, manipulable and untrustworthy indica-
tors.  Such criteria should be considered and ruled void ab initio.”79
Both Johnson and Stein requested that the debates be made open to any
person who is constitutionally eligible80 and has demonstrated “ballot
access,” which requires that the candidate qualify to have his or her name
appear on enough state ballots to have at least a mathematical chance of
securing an Electoral College majority in the 2012 general election.81
An additional suit of relevance, in which the challenger was suc-
cessful, is the 2010 complaint brought against the FEC by Dan La
Botz.82  La Botz, a member of Ohio’s Socialist Party, successfully chal-
lenged the FEC on the application of pre-established criteria in his pur-
suit to join the U.S. Senate.  La Botz alleged he was not informed of the
debate schedule and that the staging organization did not use pre-estab-
lished and objective criteria.83  The D.C. District Court found that claim
to be accurate, holding that the debate coordination may not have had
established criteria, as an internal document stated that they were to “fol-
low[ ] the structure used by the Commission on Presidential Debates,
which allows for only the major-party candidates to debate.”84  The
court pointed out that, although the Commission regulations do not re-
quire staging organizations to commit their selection criteria to writing,
the FEC strongly encourages the practice and recommends that the crite-
ria be made available to all candidates before a debate.”85  The case has
been remanded to the FEC for further proceedings.
It is clear through these cases that the courts are exhibiting great
deference to the FEC and are allowing eligibility requirements, on both
objective and arguable subjective grounds, to stand.  One essential
takeaway from the case law is that criteria resulting in an exclusionary
effect are permissible; however, that cannot be the stated intent.  If exclu-
sionary intent is stated, then a successful challenge can be lodged.  That
said, it is unfathomable that the CPD would ever admit to such a pur-
pose.  As in other areas of jurisprudence, a factitious rationale as to why
the criteria were selected is seemingly sufficient.  Given this, a wireless
carrier would be able to implement an arbitrarily selected threshold for
79 Id.
80 The candidate must be thirty-five years of age, a natural-born U.S. citizen, a resident
of the U.S. for fourteen years, and otherwise be eligible for the office of the President under
the U.S. Constitution. See 2012 Candidate Selection Criteria, COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL
DEBATES, http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=candidate-selection-process (last visited
Dec. 21, 2013).
81 See id.
82 Complaint, La Botz v. FEC, No. 11-cv-01247-BAH (D.D.C. July 8, 2011).
83 See id. at 2.
84 See La Botz v. FEC, 889 F. Supp. 2d 51, 62 (D.D.C. 2012).
85 Id. at 62.
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number of prospective donors and rationalize it as within its discretion.
As such, it is unlikely that courts would rule differently in order to allow
a candidate access to a text-message-based donation system.
D. An Unlawful Delegation of Power?
While the previous cases rested on challenging the permissibility of
the eligibility criteria themselves, a final challenge could question
whether the FEC has impermissibly delegated its power to the wireless
corporations.  Such a challenge could be supported on two fronts: first,
the FEC’s decision to afford wireless companies vast discretion in deter-
mining the criteria could be tantamount to those companies establishing
agency policy.  Second, by only retaining the right to review the criteria,
the FEC is impeding judicial review, as agencies are afforded great def-
erence under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc..86
Under Chevron, the Supreme Court instituted a two-prong test to
determine whether to defer to an agency’s determination.87  The first
prong seeks to determine whether Congress has “directly spoken to the
precise question at issue.”88  If so, the determination must strictly adhere
to such an intent.  If, however, there is any ambiguity, or Congress failed
to address the question, the court must ask whether the agency’s determi-
nation was a “reasonable” construction of the statute.89  “Reasonability”
is the essential determination—it need not be the best or most plausible
interpretation of the statute.90
Such a separation of powers challenge is not novel; Ross Perot chal-
lenged the FEC’s delegation of eligibility criteria to the CPD.91  Yet the
reviewing court rejected this argument, holding that there was no illegal
delegation as all private parties are given some discretion under agency
regulations.92  Despite the holding of the D.C. Circuit Court, there are a
number of concerns that suggest a reviewing body could find differently.
First, the FEC is an agency promulgating rules that govern national
politics and elections, yet the agency’s commissioners are selected
equally from the two primary political parties, groups which are subject
to FEC regulations.93  As such, it is not outlandish to assert that the FEC
86 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
87 Id. at 842.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 843–44.
90 Id. at 844 n.11.
91 Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
92 Id. at 560.
93 Reforming the Federal Election Commission, CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETH-
ICS IN WASHINGTON, http://www.citizensforethics.org/policy/entry/reforming-the-fec#fec2
(last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
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is susceptible to self-interest in perpetuating the status quo, which cur-
rently demonstrates a bias in favor of non-third party entities.  As was the
case with the presidential debates, the commissioners have an interest in
promulgating rules which allow the carriers to exclude third-party candi-
dates, as it allows them to retain their centralized power.  While there is
yet an expansive body of evidence to demonstrate the lack of impartiality
on the part of the commissioners, it continues to expand.
Second, the quantity of parties to which the discretion is afforded is
worrisome.  While there are a number of major carriers in the United
States, the four major players (AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile)
are members of the CTIA.  Given this unifying body, it is logically per-
ceived that the FEC has abdicated its legislative power to a private entity.
Put simply, the actions of the wireless companies seem closer to poli-
cymaking than permissible discretion afforded to regulated entities.  As
this implicates one of the essential components of the electoral process,
financing a campaign, it is nothing less than curious that the FEC did not
promulgate the criteria themselves.
More importantly, however, in permitting this scheme the FEC has
essentially sidestepped judicial review.  The wireless companies, via the
advisory opinions, have been afforded the discretion to determine the
eligibility criteria.94  Any candidate seeking to challenge these criteria
must raise their objection with the FEC, which has the authority to render
a determination through a quasi-judicial function.  This determination
can subsequently be reviewed by an Article III court.  While the latter
review may appear an adequate safeguard, there is a major deficiency:
the reviewing court must afford the agency’s determination great defer-
ence in accordance with the holdings of Chevron.95  This heightened
standard is particularly difficult to overcome.
E. Financial Incentive to Avoid Arbitrary Distinctions
Despite having the capacity to do so, wireless companies are highly
unlikely to choose to exclude a candidate from one of the two major
political parties.  Not only would the carrier’s reputation be highly sus-
ceptible to criticism,96 but they have a significant financial incentive, in
the form of processing fees, to accept contributions from both sides.97
Nevertheless, the CTIA guidelines clearly provide for terms that would
allow for the exclusion of all other candidates, as the guidelines allow
94 See generally FEC Advisory Opinion No. 2012-28.
95 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844
96 See, e.g., Kim Hart, Verizon Ends Text-Message Ban, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2007,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/27/AR20070927
00823.html.
97 See FEC Advisory Opinion 2012–17, 1, 3 n.6 (discussing payments made to wireless
carriers by companies that process text message donations).
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carriers to set artificially high barriers to entry that only Democratic and
Republican operatives could hope to surmount.  As will be addressed
later, this provides wireless companies an FEC-sanctioned tool to ex-
clude non-preferred candidates.
While this financial incentive could potentially deter arbitrary ex-
clusion, it has not deterred carriers in the analogous realm of non-politi-
cal short-code-based messaging systems.  These systems allow for
organizations to rent short codes from the Common Short Code Adminis-
tration (CSCA), though each carrier must provide that code for use.98
The wireless companies profit from the fees generated by text messages
from and to the short code over their network.99  In fact, recent conflicts
have brought to light the rather arbitrary and fluid ways in which wire-
less carriers make determinations for specific organizations.
One prominent incident involved Verizon Wireless and its decision
to not provide the short code of a pro-choice group.  In September 2007,
Verizon chose not to provide a code for NARAL Pro-Choice America,100
despite having allowed for similar campaigns from other organiza-
tions.101  The wireless carrier “informed NARAL that it ‘does not accept
issue-oriented (abortion, war, etc.) programs’ and that it would refuse
service to ‘any organization that seeks to promote an agenda or distribute
content that, in its discretion, may be seen as controversial or unsavory to
any of [its] users.’”102  Though a valid stance under current law, Verizon
reversed its position after it suffered substantial negative publicity.103
Perhaps more intriguing is Verizon’s refusal to release its internal
policy on the criteria it employs to approve or deny groups.104  While the
company could have given any number of reasons to mask its true ratio-
nale for refusing, it is nearly impossible to imagine that the decision was
made for commercial and not for political considerations.  As NARAL
never sought legal recourse,105 there is no indication how a court would
have evaluated the facts.
98 See Text Message & Short Code Services Discrimination, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (last
visited Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1372.
99 See id.
100 Adam Liptak, Verizon Blocks Messages of Abortion Rights Groups, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
27, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/27/us/27verizon.html.
101 See Text Message & Short Code Services Discrimination, supra note 98.
102 Id.
103 Adam Liptak, Verizon Reverses Itself on Abortion Messages, N.Y. Times (Sept. 27,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/27/business/27cnd-verizon.html.
104 See id.
105 See id. (noting that Verizon’s decision to reverse its position was due to an internal
reassessment).
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F. A Legislative Response
While there is little indication the Judicial Branch is prepared to
address the system’s current deficiencies, Congress, in the context of
presidential debates, has introduced a number of bills which sought to
mandate that any candidate receiving federal funding is eligible to par-
ticipate in the debates.106  Yet, none of these bills passed or even re-
ceived substantial support while the bills were being proposed.107
Despite this past lack of enthusiasm, Congress could conceivably attempt
to introduce legislation mandating that any candidate eligible for federal
funds be “eligible” under criteria established by wireless carriers.
An outstanding issue remains, however, as Congress, as an entity
comprised almost entirely of Democrats and Republicans, has little in-
centive to open the door to independent and third party candidates.  As
such, this bipartisan blockade is likely to impede, nay, prevent, a legisla-
tive solution.
This Part provides a context for the numerous arguments and chal-
lenges that have been made against eligibility criteria in various aspects
of the FEC’s purview.  Specifically, this Part addresses the key argu-
ments that have been made against the permissibility of the criteria, and
why such arguments failed.  In addition to highlighting potential grounds
ripe for further challenges, this section ultimately serves to demonstrate
the difficulty such challenges face, both in the judicial and legislative
arenas.  Yet as the text message donation scheme utilizes wireless spec-
trum, it extends into territory governed by the Federal Communications
Commission.  The following Part seeks to address the potential overlap
and the challenges that could be raised under the relevant FCC
provisions.
III. THE FCC’S ROLE
While the proposed text message donating methods are consistent
with the Federal Election Campaign Act, as the donating methods utilize
wireless spectrum to conduct transactions, it is plausible that eligibility
criteria could violate tenets of the Federal Communications Act.  Specifi-
cally, questions arise as to whether or not such restrictions are in viola-
tion of a wireless carrier’s common carrier status.
Outside observers of the NARAL incident questioned why a wire-
less carrier was permitted to discriminate on the basis of content, given
106 See generally Keith Darren Eisner, Comment, Non-Major-Party Candidates and Tele-
vised Presidential Debates: The Merits of Legislative Inclusion, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 973,
1015–20 (1993).
107 See id.
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that they are subject to regulation by the FCC.108  Telephone companies
that provide voice services are treated as common carriers under Title II
of the Communications Act, which requires such carriers to provide all
members of the public with access to their services and forbids discrimi-
nation based on the content or speaker.109  Why, then, was Verizon not in
violation of Title II?
Professor Susan Crawford posits that such restrictions apply only
when the carrier is engaged in providing specific services.110  She argues
that
The Communications Act says that commercial cellular
providers have to act in a nondiscriminatory fashion to
the extent they are providing “commercial mobile ser-
vices.”  But “commercial mobile telephone services” are
defined as services that are interconnected with the tradi-
tional phone network—reachable via dialing a phone
number.  Arguably, the short codes that the carriers al-
low people to subscribe to . . . are not “phone number”
services.111
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court validated a similar dis-
tinction in its decision in FCC v. Brand X Internet Services.112  In Brand
X, the Court affirmed the FCC’s ruling that cable companies providing
broadband Internet access were not “telecommunications services,” de-
spite providing access to communication technology, and thus, were not
bound by the common carrier rules.113  The FCC, instead, classified
broadband providers as “information services.”114  In 2007, the FCC is-
sued a declaratory ruling in which it reiterated its classification of wire-
less broadband Internet as an “information service” and not a
“commercial mobile service” under section 322 of the Act.115  The ques-
tion remains as to what category a text message falls under for purposes
of FCC regulation.
108 See, e.g., Susan Crawford, The Big Picture: Why the Verizon/NARAL Flap Matters,
SCRAWFORD BLOG (Sept. 28, 2007), http://scrawford.net/the-big-picture-why-the-verizonnaral-
flap-matters.
109 See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–209 (2000) (outlining fully the regulations, schedules,
and fees Title II imposes on common carriers).
110 See Marjorie Heins, Can Cellphone Companies Censor Text Messages?, THE FREE
EXPRESSION POLICY PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.fepproject.org/commentaries/text
messaging.html.
111 Id.
112 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
113 See id. at 973.
114 Id. at 974 .
115 See FCC Rcd. 07-30 1, 1–2 (Mar. 22, 2007).
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As of yet, the FCC has not indicated how it intends to treat text
messages under common carrier restrictions.  Since 2008, there has been
a pending proceeding with the FCC specifically requesting guidance on
whether text messages and short codes are subject Title II or 202 non-
discrimination rules.116  As of December 2012, the proceeding remains
open, with over 500 fillings collected.117  Given the length of the pro-
ceeding, it is evident that the FCC is not rushing to make a conclusive
determination.  Thus, as the laws currently stand, wireless-carrier-estab-
lished eligibility criteria are permissible under both the Federal Election
Campaign Act and the Federal Communications Act.
IV. THE IMPACT
The FEC’s decision to permit text-message-based donation pro-
grams subject to carrier-applied eligibility criteria influences the election
landscape in three distinct ways.  First, permissible eligibility criteria
serve to perpetuate America’s oft-derided two-party system.118  Through
the use of artificially rigorous eligibility criteria, wireless carriers are af-
forded the ability to bar specific candidates from participating in their
systems.  As noted previously, candidates likely to meet these thresholds
originate from the two dominant political parties, and thus have access to
an established network of high-income donors.  In contrast, third-party
candidates lack the backing of well-financed major-party organizations
and PACs and are subsequently more likely to finance their campaigns
with personal funds and loans.119  Thus, the candidates that could benefit
most from such a system are disproportionately excluded.120  The crite-
ria, however, may not simply be used to preclude all third-party candi-
dates.  Instead, wireless carriers could tailor the criteria to selectively
admit the candidates they believe will harm the company’s non-favored
candidate.  In what I have termed the “Nader-effect,” carriers could ad-
mit a third-party candidate who is known to appeal to similar constituen-
cies as the carrier’s non-preferred candidate.  Through such a scheme,
116 See generally Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on Petition for
Declaratory Ruling that Text Messages and Short Codes Are Title II Services or Are Title I
Services Subject to Section 202 Non-Discrimination Rules, WT Docket No. 08-7, DA 08-78
(WTB rel. Jan. 14, 2008).
117 THE FCC ELECTRONIC COMMENT FILING SYSTEM, http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/proceeding/
view;jsessionid=yn8xPKdpDJWRpZj2QFBN6HQjXp1pGcvv6xxw8dBQTkpnpLtpT3Jr!1471
562840!-321460796?name=08-7 (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
118 See generally Lisa J. Disch, The Tyranny of the Two-Party System (2002) (discussing
how different forms of electoral regulation and eligibility criteria perpetuate the two party
system).
119 Paul Herrnson & Ron Faucheux, Outside Looking In: Views of Third Party and Inde-
pendent Candidates, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Aug. 1999, available at http://www.bsos.umd
.edu/gvpt/herrnson/art3.html.
120 See generally id.
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the carriers could facilitate the siphoning of funds from a mainstream
candidate to a third-party candidate in an attempt to diminish the for-
mer’s standing.  While sources remain conflicted about whether Ralph
Nader actually siphoned enough votes to cost Al Gore the 2000 elec-
tion,121 it seems an apt metaphor for this type of tactic.
Second, the current framework will undoubtedly increase the com-
mercialization of elections.  This does not only refer to the increase in
expected political contributions and the additional expenditures they en-
able, but also encompasses the increased resources campaigns will utilize
to inform potential donors of this method of giving.  There is also a large
financial incentive for wireless companies and corporate aggregators,
like m-Qube, to reach out to prospective donors and advocate for this
new donation method.  A typical “outpayment”—the amount that the
campaign receives after wireless service and aggregator fees—ranges be-
tween fifty to seventy percent of the consumer charges.122  Phrased in the
inverse, thirty to fifty percent of a donor’s contribution never reaches
their candidate’s coffers.  It is not irrational to believe that most consum-
ers will not know that their whole donation does not reach the candidate.
While some would argue this is no different than donating through a
credit card, where there are processing fees, the sum charged by aggre-
gators is significantly higher than their credit card counterparts: credit
card companies skim only two or three percent.123  By June 2012, before
the election season was in full swing, the Obama and Romney campaigns
had paid over 5 million dollars in credit card swipe fees; thus it is not
unreasonable to believe aggregator fees would reach the tens, possibly
hundreds, of thousands of dollars.124
Yet, should the campaigns have to divulge this information to the
individual donor?  An Obama campaign official stated that “Every ave-
nue of fundraising that we have costs us money. . . .  We pay the most
competitive rates available in the marketplace to ensure our supporters
have the greatest impact with their contribution.”125  While the “greatest
impact” is in their favor, it does little to educate the donor of the quantity
121 See, e.g., Michael C. Herron & Jeffrey B. Lewis, Did Ralph Nader Spoil a Gore
Presidency? A Ballot-Level Study of Green and Reform Party Voters in the 2000 Presidential
Election, April 2006, available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/lewis/pdf/greenre
form9.pdf.
122 FEC Advisory Opinion No. 2012–17.
123 Andrew Zajac, Campaign Giving by Text Seen as Fee Source: BGOV Barometer,
BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-05/campaign-giving-
by-text-seen-as-new-fee-source-bgov-barometer.html.
124 Id.
125 Alina Selyukh, Obama Campaign to Start Accepting Text Message Donations, NBC
NEWS (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/technolog/obama-campaign-
start-accepting-text-message-donations-960863.
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of funds that are siphoned by private corporations.  Should not the FEC
offer guidance on this matter?
Consequently, if money is held to be political speech, a question for
future debate remains: are these processing fees detracting from a do-
nor’s ability to exercise free expression?  These questions remain unan-
swered, but are worth considering as this and similar donation methods
continue to evolve.
Notably, these problems are not limited to the federal level.  Mary-
land and California have already approved text campaign donations in
state races, and other states will inevitably broach the topic.  “It is going
to be synonymous with campaign fundraising very soon,” according to
Jared DeMarinis, a representative for the Maryland State Board of Elec-
tions.126  Further, such schemes will inevitably expand outside of the
campaign realm and into those of PACs.  A Houston-based PAC has
asked the Texas Ethics Commission to approve a proposal that would
allow them to solicit contributions via text message across the state.127
Lastly, the FEC’s decision to open this method of donating to indi-
viduals, but not corporations, serves to perpetuate the increasingly arbi-
trary distinctions in how funds can be contributed to political races.  On
the pragmatic level, corporations lack opposable thumbs and are thus
incapable of donating via text message.  Furthermore, corporations are
prohibited from donating to federal candidates.128  On a fundamental
level, however, the FEC continues to permit and prohibit funding
schemes that treat corporations differently from natural persons without
explaining their rationale.  While such distinctions are not of paramount
importance at this juncture, these decisions serve to highlight the FEC’s
proclivity for ignoring important issues, issues that will inevitably need
to be addressed given the continual influx of money in politics.
CONCLUSION
Given the deference afforded to the FEC, it is highly unlikely that a
challenge to the eligibility criteria could be successfully sustained.  As
the use of criteria in the election process has been upheld and the FCC,
under current law, does not require wireless carriers to open their ser-
vices to all organizations, the viable grounds for a legal challenge are
highly limited.  As a result, wireless carriers are free to engage in deci-
sions that may not reflect the neutral tendencies some members of the
126 Zajac, supra note 123.
127 Dave Nyczepir, PAC Wants State Approval for Text Donations, CAMPAIGNS & ELEC-
TIONS (Oct. 1 2012), available at http://www.campaignsandelections.com/campaign-insider/
329152/pac-wants-state-approval-for-text-donations.thtml.
128 Prohibitions on contributions, expenditures and electioneering communications, 11
C.F.R. § 114.2 (2014).
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public wish to see exhibited.  Thus, barring any potential action from the
FCC concerning the classification of text-messages, it can reasonably be
assumed that text-message-based political donation systems will be an
evolving fixture of the modern election landscape.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-2\CJP204.txt unknown Seq: 24 18-APR-14 14:31
